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Abstract How climate models came to gain and exercise epistemic authority has
been a key concern of recent climate change historiography. Using newly released
archival materials and recently conducted interviews with key actors, we reconstruct
negotiations between UK climate scientists and policymakers which led to the
opening of the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research in 1990. We
historicize earlier arguments about the unique institutional culture of the Hadley
Centre, and link this culture to broader characteristics of UK regulatory practice and
environmental politics. A product of a particular time and place, the Hadley Centre
was shaped not just by scientific ambition, but by a Conservative governmental
preference for ‘sound science’ and high evidential standards in environmental
policymaking. Civil servants sought a prediction programme which would appeal to
such sensibilities, with transient and regional climate simulation techniques seem-
ingly offering both scientific prestige and persuasive power. Beyond the national
level, we also offer new insights into the early role of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change and an evolving international political context in the shaping of
scientific practices and institutions.
Keywords Climate change  Models  Science and policy  Environmental politics 
Civic epistemology
& Martin Mahony
martin.mahony@nottingham.ac.uk
1 School of Geography, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
2 Department of Geography, King’s College London, London, UK
123
Minerva (2016) 54:445–470
DOI 10.1007/s11024-016-9302-0
Introduction
Complex scientific models of the climate system have occupied a prominent place
in the politics of climate change since the 1970s. In particular, general circulation
models (GCMs) have offered quantitative estimates and qualitative visions of
putative futures, which have found their way into broader cultural narratives of
climate change. These narratives oscillate between the apparent certitude of
impending crisis and the hazy, disarming uncertainty of innumerable possible
outcomes of environmental and social change. Epistemologically speaking, climate
models pose challenges to the assumed independence of theory, experiment and
observation (Dowling 1999; Sismondo 2008). Culturally, they unsettle accepted
boundaries between fact and value, science and politics (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998;
Weingart 1999; Walsh 2009; Hulme 2011). Politically, models render environmen-
tal change as a problem which can only be suitably addressed at the global scale
(Ashley 1983; Demeritt 2001; Miller 2004; Oels 2005; Dahan 2010; Hulme 2010).
Long-term model projections of the ‘earth system’, replete with a fecundity of
interrelated, human/nonhuman sub-systems, offer a challenging totality which
seemingly must be carefully managed within prescribed limits and boundaries (e.g.
Rockstro¨m et al. 2009).
In this paper we seek to explore the relationship between climate modelling and
climate change policy. More specifically, we seek to historicize the close
relationship between climate modelling and climate politics which has been
observed by many scholars (e.g. Shackley 2001; Demeritt 2001; Miller 2004;
Edwards 2010). This observation of a close relationship has been made from a
number of standpoints: the natural proximity of facts and values (Winsberg 2010;
Intemann 2015), the intertwining of knowledge and power in the ‘governmental-
isation’ of climate change (Oels 2005), the technological ‘enframing’ of human
action (Hamilton 2015), or the co-production of global knowledge and nascent
global political orders (Miller 2004, 2009). Climate models have been understood as
key actors at the ‘science-policy interface’, mediating between the social worlds of
science and politics, and fundamentally shaping understanding of, and even
responses to, climate change. While we concur with many of these analyses, we also
think it important to attend closely to the social constitution of the science-policy
interface, in order to explain exactly how it is that this modelling-politics nexus has
attained the shape that it has today. Such an approach is not without precedent (see
below), but we contend that more fine-grained studies of the spaces where science
and politics meet are needed to make sense of the imbrications of knowledge and
power, facts and values, in the social world of climate change discourse.
Our study focuses on the institutionalisation of climate modelling and prediction
in the UK in the late 1980s. The period between 1985 and 1990 was a formative one
for the science and politics of climate change (Agrawala 1998). The Villach
Conference of 1985 produced influential scientific statements that ‘significant
climate change’ was ‘highly probable’, and recommended states start consideration
of a global climate convention (WMO 1986). 1988 saw the formation of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the World Conference on
446 M. Mahony, M. Hulme
123
the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto, the latter recommending cuts to global CO2
emissions of 20% by 2005 (Bodansky 1995). On an unusually hot day in June 1988,
NASA’s Jim Hansen gave testimony to the US Senate, including observational
evidence that the earth was now warmer than at any other time in the instrumental
record. Hansen famously argued that ‘‘the greenhouse effect has been detected, and
it is changing our climate now’’. Responding to the prevailing weather conditions
and appealing to the thermal discomfort of the sweltering hearing room, Hansen told
the committee that ‘‘our simulations indicate that the greenhouse effect is already
large enough to begin to effect the probability of extreme events such as summer
heat waves’’ (Hansen 1988). Hansen’s testimony was one among a number of high-
profile media events at the time which pushed climate change into the public sphere,
bringing with it increasingly confident knowledge claims about future climate which
rested on climate models. Hansen’s testimony neatly illustrated the new epistemic
power of climate models to offer convincing visions of the future, and to potentially
transform understandings of the climatic present.
It is nonetheless important to attend to the variegated geographies of this
‘epistemic power’ (Mahony and Hulme 2012: 208). Three-dimensional climate
modelling is a specialised activity and GCMs are only operated at a few institutional
locations worldwide where the requisite expertise combines with high levels of
financial support (Edwards 2010). These modelling centres exhibit different
institutional cultures, expressed, for example, in different management structures,
research priorities, academic networks, working styles and links to policymakers.
These differences have been elucidated through sociological and ethnographic
work, most notably by Shackley (2001) and Krueck and Borchers (1999), and
through studies of institutional histories (e.g. Howe 2014). Our historiographical
contention is that studying moments of institutional formation can yield important
insights into how the kinds of scientific cultures or ‘epistemic lifestyles’ described
by Shackley came about, thus offering explanatory resources for the varying styles
of climate modelling which are discernible to this day.
Furthermore, following Jasanoff (2004), institutions can be understood as key
sites for the co-production of knowledge and social order, where new knowledge-
making practices emerge alongside new ways of thinking about and ordering social
relations. ‘‘As stable repositories of knowledge and power, institutions offer ready-
made instruments for putting things in their places at times of uncertainty and
disorder’’. In institutions such as scientific laboratories or judicial systems,
‘‘societies have access to tried-and-true repertoires of problem-solving, including
preferred forms of expertise, processes of inquiry, methods of securing credibility,
and mechanisms for airing and managing dissent’’ (ibid: 39–40). In the context of
climate change, much analytical attention has been directed at institutional
innovation, in studies of how societies have developed new institutional structures
to deal with the ‘uncertainty and disorder’ of a changing climate (e.g. Shackley and
Wynne 1995; Nolin 1999; Miller 2004). Likewise, histories of climate science have
focused on an internal story of discovery and institution-building, arguably without
sufficient regard for cross-sectoral continuity in institutionalised ways of producing
and authorising knowledge (e.g. Weart 2010; Edwards 2010).
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Our case in this paper is the establishment of the Hadley Centre for Climate
Prediction and Research at the UK Met Office. The Hadley Centre was opened in
1990, at the height of the early political interest in climate change which culminated
in the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1992. Making use of newly available archives1 as well as recently
conducted interviews with key actors in science and government, we reconstruct the
deliberations between scientists, research managers and policymakers which led to
the establishment of the UK’s first and only dedicated climate change prediction
programme.2 The case points to the importance of political context in both creating
the conditions for new kinds of knowledge production, and in shaping the kinds of
knowledge which have been pursued at the science-policy interface. We argue that
the period between 1988 and 1992 saw a concerted re-patterning of the horizontal
relationships between atmospheric science and government, and of the vertical
relationships between national and international modes of climatic knowledge-
making, in a fashion which reflects changes observable in other scientific fields and
policy domains, both at the time and since (Miller 2009). Concerning the horizontal
relationships, we argue that the object of climate change, and the technology of
climate models, effected new relationships between scientists and political actors,
extending from civil servants to the UK Prime Minister at the time, Margaret
Thatcher. In the vertical dimension, we argue that the establishment of the IPCC had
important effects on the conduct of climate science – an effect which has been
appreciably under-studied in contemporary science studies. But we also argue that
these transformations can be understood within a wider context of institutionalised
forms of knowledge-making in the UK. It is a story of radical change, but we wish
to emphasise how the shape of that change was importantly shaped by what had
gone before.
The New Politics of Climate in the UK
Prior to the 1940s, the climatological section of the Meteorological Office was an
unassuming division of data-gatherers and book-keepers, dependent on a network of
around 5,000 amateur weather observers. Following the Second World War,
climatological information began to attract the interest of the utilities sector,
particularly energy suppliers, motivated in part by climatological extremes such as
the severe winter of 1946/7 (Hall 2012). However, with climatological work split
between forecast services and research divisions, climatology in the Met Office3
was essentially defined as that which wasn’t synoptic meteorology (Hall 2015a). It
1 Particularly the files AT 33/77 and AT 33/78 at the National Archives, Kew, UK. These were made
public in February 2013.
2 Between January and July 2015 we interviewed three current or former employees of the Met Office,
three from the Department of Environment, and one former head of a concurrent climate modelling
programme. All had been active in negotiations between the Government and the Met Office during the
period 1988–1992.
3 The Meteorological Office officially became the Met Office in 2000, but we use the latter title for
brevity.
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was arguably Hubert H. Lamb and Gordon Manley who developed new links in the
UK between the record-keeping style of climatology and scientists concerned with
the dynamics of the atmosphere, introducing ideas of climatic change at large
scales. In the 1960s, as interest in the general circulation and the possibilities of
large scale climatic change and even control took hold, John Mason (Director-
General of the Met Office 1965-83) placed new emphasis on computational
facilities both for purposes of numerical weather prediction and for the newly re-
organised Dynamical Climatology and Synoptic Climatology research groups. The
immediate post-war period had seen the Met Office consolidate its near-monopoly
position as a national weather information provider, as the technical advances of
World War II were paired with a new, public- and business-facing ethos of service
provision. Although commercial logics grew in prominence internally, the Met
Office never encountered the kind of private competition which the US Weather
Bureau, for instance, was faced with. Mason capitalised on the Office’s new public
profile and resources when he took office, with one of his first acts being the
operationalisation of numerical weather prediction (Hall 2015b). Generous support
from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) bolstered this computational turn, and also
meant the Met Office could resist being pulled into the orbit of newly established
government research funders, such as the Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC). International links, promoted by Mason through organisations like GARP
(the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1967–1982) under the auspices of the
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), contributed to the acceleration in
modelling capacities as a Met Office GCM was built up (Walker 2012; Hall 2015b).
The Met Office was aware of and involved in the earliest international scientific
debates about global climate change in the 1960s, but it wasn’t until the late 1970s
that climate change as a potential policy issue had its first encounter with the UK
Government. As Agar (2015) has recently shown, the Conservative government’s
first encounter with climate change was far from straightforward. The Interdepart-
mental Group on Climatology (IGC), convened in October 1978 under the
chairmanship of economist Kenneth Berrill, was commissioned by the Labour
government in 1979 to write a review of the science of climate change. By the time
of its publication, the Conservatives were in power and the new administration was
clearly keen to distance itself from the report, with a steer apparently coming from
the very top. The report concluded that climatic fluctuations over the next century
were unlikely to be smaller than those of the preceding century, that the influence of
fossil fuel burning was the most serious cause for concern, and that more research
was needed. After a delay, the report was ‘‘grudgingly’’ put out by the government,
amid worries about its lack of a real message. Accepting that the report might
nonetheless help display to pressure groups a genuine concern for long-term
environmental issues on the part of the government, the report was published in
February 1980, receiving a fairly ‘cool’ response both in the media, and from
Margaret Thatcher herself (Agar 2015).
Fast-forward to the 1990s, and a very different picture of the horizontal
alignment of climate science and politics emerges. This picture has been mostly
clearly painted by Shackley (2001), drawing on ethnographic observations of
climate modelling practice, his rendering of ‘epistemic lifestyles’ and institutional
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cultures made sharper through his comparative methodology. While the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Colorado displayed a largely non-
hierarchical structure, a focus on ‘pure’ research and relative intellectual freedom
for researchers (see also Howe 2014), the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and
Research at the Met Office exhibited what Shackley called a ‘hybrid’ modelling
style. ‘Climate seers’ dominated the modelling activities – i.e. those interested in
exploring and experimenting with the modelled climate system and its changes, as
opposed to ‘model constructors’ who are more interested in the construction of
complex models as an end in itself.4 The latter style is perhaps more akin to the
culture observed by Krueck and Borchers in the Hamburg network of climate
modellers, at the centre of which sat the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology and
the German Climate Computing Centre (DKRZ); a culture which they compared to
a relatively ‘‘more focused and conservative’’ style of research at the Hadley Centre
where the emphasis was on the delivery of ‘‘sound, useable science’’ (Krueck and
Borchers 1999: 117). Crucially, the Hadley Centre had a very different relationship
to policymakers than any of its American or German rivals: ‘‘the policy-influenced
objectives and priorities of the research organization, as defined by its leadership,
take preference over other…motivations and styles’’ (Shackley 2001: 128). In
Hamburg, modelling was largely ‘‘aloof from politics’’ (Krueck and Borchers 1999:
123). At the Hadley Centre, through negotiations with a small ‘‘coterie of
policymakers’’, money was allocated to the organization as a whole and research
priorities set (Shackley 2001: 128; see also Shackley and Wynne 1995, 1996).
Our interest in this paper is in how the relationship between climate science and
the UK government changed so dramatically in the intervening years between
Thatcher’s early coolness and the formation of a coterie of prediction-hungry
policymakers. In the next section, we describe how ideas for a new ‘National
Climate Centre’ began to take shape in the late 1980s.
A ‘National Climate Centre’
From the very start of recorded discussions of what was initially referred to as a
National Climate Centre, it is clear that the establishment of the IPCC by the WMO
and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was influential in key actors’
thinking about the epistemic demands posed by an emerging politics of climate. In
an oral history given to the British Library, Sir John Houghton (Director General/
Chief Executive of the Met Office, 1983–91) responded to a question about the
formation of the Hadley Centre by referring immediately to the new international
body: ‘‘the IPCC was key to that’’ (Houghton and Merchant 2011: 180). Houghton
attended the first IPCC meeting in Geneva in November 1988 along with David
Fisk, the Department of the Environment’s (DoE) Chief Scientist. With Fisk’s
support, Houghton accepted the chairmanship of IPCC’s Working Group I and DoE
4 Shackley did not pass judgement on the merits of these different styles, and neither do we. While
NCAR may appear a utopian bastion of intellectual autonomy, Shackley reported some envy among
American modellers for the more rigid, task-focused structure of the Hadley Centre.
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pledged resources to support the scientific and clerical work which would be
required to conduct the assessment. Geoff Jenkins, a Met Office scientist who had
been on secondment at DoE until late 1988, was given the task of heading up this
early version of what would later come to be called an IPCC Technical Support
Unit. But not all of the Met Office’s directors were convinced that climate change
came under the remit of a state meteorological service:
There were people who were not particularly interested in the whole climate
issue I guess. And they felt the Met Office had a big enough job to forecast the
weather…so to get sidestepped into doing things that weren’t directly our job
was not what they wanted to do. Because, as I say, it clearly wasn’t in our
remit to do it. I couldn’t have got the sort of millions to spend on that sort of
thing from MoD (Sir John Houghton, interview).
Despite these reservations, Houghton moved quickly to start gathering the
resources required for a new climate change centre which could act as a focal point
for the UK’s input into the IPCC process: ‘‘we were getting on with it’’ (ibid). Four
days after the Geneva meeting where the idea of the DoE supporting a new research
programme was seemingly born, Houghton wrote to Fisk with a proposed ‘National
Plan for Climate Change’, calling for an expansion of both observational studies and
predictive modelling. The latter, however, was the clear priority and was to be the
focus of any new resources. While paleoclimatology – the reconstruction of past
climates using non-instrumental sources such as tree rings – was considered
‘‘valuable in relation to the assessment of future climate change’’, Houghton
suggested that it ‘‘probably needs little or no extra stimulation’’. The success of
earlier model simulations at the Met Office of climate (e.g. Gilchrist et al. 1973),
and of equilibrium climate change (e.g. Mitchell 1983; see also Folland et al. 2004),
meant that the modelling programme should be ‘‘accelerated’’ in order to inform
emerging policy debates.5 Yet the salience of these policy debates was not
something which was expected only to emerge after a firm scientific picture had first
been produced. Rather, the political context of climate change was already taking
shape.
On 27th September 1988, Margaret Thatcher had given a speech to the Royal
Society’s annual dinner in which she proffered her new concern about global
warming and environmental change. After extolling the virtues of ‘‘keenly
competitive’’ researchers and their centrality to ‘‘national prosperity and interna-
tional standing’’, Thatcher expressed unease about the environmental impacts of the
massive changes wrought by industrialisation, specifically in terms of population
growth, agriculture and the use of fossil fuels. ‘‘It is possible’’, she famously
suggested, ‘‘that…we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system
of this planet itself’’. With the ‘‘health of the economy and the health of our
environment…totally dependent on one another’’, environmental policy measures
could be rationally justified, especially with the help of Britain’s world-leading
climate scientists. Nonetheless, Thatcher hinted at high evidential standards for the
scientific knowledge upon which any climate policy would be based: ‘‘We must
5 Houghton to Fisk, 15 Nov 1988, The National Archives [hereafter ‘TNA’] AT 33/77.
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ensure that what we do is founded on good science to establish cause and effect’’
(Thatcher 1988).
Scholars of regulatory and advisory science have noted a preference in British
environmental policy for high evidential standards. Jasanoff in particular has
observed a British policy culture and ‘civic epistemology’ which ‘‘shares with
British science a pragmatic, empirical orientation, producing scepticism about
claims that appear to go beyond the observable facts of nature or society’’ (2005:
263). In early environmental policy debates, ‘‘regulatory policy was based only on
what could be known with near absolute certainty’’ (ibid: 264; see also Brickman
et al. 1985; Jasanoff 1991). One of our interview respondents, reflecting on his time
as a scientific advisor at DoE, linked this trait explicitly to Conservative attitudes to
environmental issues, explaining that government figures would ‘‘need to be
convinced’’ that any policy measures were
being done on a good, sound scientific basis, because their supra-policy was
that they would do anything as long as there was good scientific evidence for
it. And then they’d have very high barriers for what constituted evidence (DoE
science advisor, interview).
For another DoE official (interview), this emphasis on ‘sound science’ as a basis
for policy ‘‘became explicit during the Conservative administration’’, and was
expressed particularly clearly in deliberations concerning ozone depletion and acid
rain, where Britain’s reputation as the laggardly ‘Dirty Man of Europe’ was
enhanced by a reluctance to sign acid rain treaties without first waiting for scientific
clarity over causal mechanisms, where others operationalised the precautionary
principle (see Rose 1990):
In fact it was Margaret Thatcher who said almost precisely that: ‘how many
salmon will shutting down Drax [Britain’s largest coal-fired power station]
save?’ We don’t know. Now, with work, we can get towards an answer (DoE
official, interview).
Convinced of the need for action on acid rain in the early 1980s, DoE officials
turned to advanced computer modelling as a means of offering ministers clearer
pictures of transnational chemical causation, as the concept of ‘critical loads’ gained
traction as a means of precisely defining how much pollutant a specific, local
ecosystem could absorb before damage occurred (Nilsson 1988).6 While Jasanoff
detects in British civic epistemology and environmental politics ‘‘an empiricist
distrust of untested and overextended models’’, even a ‘‘residual scepticism toward
all model-based predictions’’ (Jasanoff 2011: 137, emphasis in original), it seems
that by the middle of the 1980s, DoE ‘‘were very used to modelling as a basis of
prediction’’, policymaking and policy enforcement, as departmental experts made
use of simulated chemical transport to critique other countries’ reported sulphur
6 We might speculate too on the significance of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in spurring new links
between atmospheric modelling and governmental decision-making. The Met Office was operationally
active during the incident, and was subsequently sanctioned by government to generate new emergency
response modelling capabilities. A new atmospheric dispersion model, developed specifically for nuclear
accidents, was operational by 1988 (Jones et al. 2007).
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dioxide emissions (DoE official, interview). In this period then, we can begin to see
how the ‘pragmatic empiricism’ of UK regulatory culture was being reconciled with
what we might see as a contrary reliance on models, simulation and prediction.
Amid demands for high evidential standards, civil servants and policymakers alike
were developing confidence in particular environmental models which could act as
quasi-empirical surrogates for deficient data or intractable causal complexity.
A strain of this pragmatic empiricism can be detected in a meeting of British
climate scientists convened in response to Thatcher’s Royal Society speech. The
meeting on 7th November 1988 was convened under the auspices of the British
National Committee of the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) to
‘‘discuss the scientific community’s response to the speech made by the Prime
Minister’’. John Mason was in the chair and penned the report, which was clearly
aimed at the atmospheric sciences’ national paymasters. The assembled members
took the view
that a realistic investment in research (as part of planned international
programmes) and aimed at narrowing the wide range of current estimates,
would be a prudent and small insurance premium relative to the enormous
costs that would be involved in attempting to ameliorate the impact of the
worst of these predictions.7
The ‘wide range of current estimates’ referred mainly to the results of
equilibrium experiments with GCMs, whereby the models were run with doubled
CO2 levels until the climate reached a new stable state. Most of these experiments
by 1988 had been conducted at US modelling centres. For the committee, it
therefore appeared important that
the UK, acting perhaps on behalf of Europe in this matter should maintain the
ability to make independent judgements on such important and controversial
issues. Because of our leadership in European meteorology and our reputation
for critical and balanced judgements in these matters, the UK could easily take
the lead in developing a European stance on these issues, which are bound to
attract some wild and conflicting views.8
In these words we can hear the characteristic voice of Mason, who had been
known in government circles for his scepticism about the potential for long-term or
catastrophic climatic changes since the 1970s (see Agar 2015; Mason 1976). A
cloud physicist by training and a keen advocate of new computing methods in the
face of some intransigence within the Meteorological Office (Martin-Nielsen 2015;
Hall 2015b),9 Mason had responded to early predictions of anthropogenic climate
7 Mason, J., ‘Record of meeting to discuss UK research on climate change’, TNA AT 33/77, p 1.
8 Ibid, pp 1–2. Mason perhaps had in mind the UK’s hosting of the European Centre for Medium-range
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), opened in 1975. As one senior UGAMP (Universities Global Atmospheric
Modelling Project) scientist suggested, ‘‘John Mason wanted it [ECMWF] here, partly to keep his eye on
it I think’’ (interview).
9 Martin-Nielsen (2015) describes tensions between the computationally-minded Mason and Hubert H.
Lamb’s more interdisciplinary approach to understanding climate. This clash of cultures culminated in
Lamb’s founding of the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia.
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change in a way which chimes with Jasanoff’s posited culture of pragmatic
empiricism. In the late 1970s Mason had recognised the ‘‘potential importance and
concern’’ of the topic, advocating for a ‘‘sustained research programme’’ to improve
understanding of past and current trends, and their underlying mechanisms (Mason
1976: 473). He had ‘‘set out to debunk United States alarmist views’’ (Mason,
quoted in Agar 2015: 15) and, through the establishment of a new committee of
scientists and government figures in 1977, to exert ‘‘a measure of control’’, as Agar
puts it, ‘‘from a sceptical Met Office point of view’’ on a topic about which other
institutions were starting to establish a strong voice (Agar 2015: 16). Mason’s bid to
exert some control, both through committees and by stimulating new modelling
work within the Met Office, was clearly a response to outside arguments which, to
paraphrase Jasanoff (2005), appeared to contradict accepted and ‘observable’ facts
about climate and society (see Mason 1976; for a retrospective account, see Mason
2010).
After a decade of further model development, Mason was still convinced by the
need for a ‘‘sane and critical voice outside the United States’’ (quoted in Rose 1990:
299), and the British Committee of WCRP meeting in November 1988 argued for
investment in modelling to encourage improvement ‘‘to the stage at which their
predictions converge and thereby provide more reliable advice to governments’’.10
These arguments were being made at a time when close links were being developed
between the Meteorological Office and DoE. From the mid-1980s, Met Office
scientists had been sent on secondments to DoE in order to feed knowledge into
other atmospheric policy domains like acid rain and ozone depletion. Although the
issue of climate change had not been on the agenda at the start of the secondments
programme, the presence of Met Office employees in DoE was significant as
international reports like that produced in Villach (WMO 1986) pushed climate up
the political agenda, helping smooth the way to new cooperative and financial
relationships.
Likewise, a Met Office scientist had been sent to the Natural Environment
Research Council (NERC) to help sharpen that body’s focus on the atmospheric
sciences, which until that point had received just 0.4% of NERC’s funding.11 In
1987, NERC had established UGAMP, the UK Universities Global Atmospheric
Modelling Project, centred on the University of Reading. While Met Office
modellers had been refining their analyses of the equilibrium effects of increased
CO2, UGAMP scientists were focusing largely on processes, for example, seeking to
better understand the mechanisms of cyclogenesis or the behaviour of the
stratosphere. But it is clear that the UGAMP network was never considered as an
alternative to the Met Office as a home for a new national modelling centre.
UGAMP scientists were focusing purely on atmospheric modelling, rather than the
kind of coupled ocean-atmosphere modelling required for long timescale climate
prediction, while the wider NERC community had not engaged in the development
of a global ocean model (interview, Met Office research manager and former NERC
10 Mason, Record of meeting, p 2.
11 Houghton to Fisk, 15 Nov 1988, TNA AT 33/77.
454 M. Mahony, M. Hulme
123
secondee). The Met Office was therefore considered the natural home for the new
prediction programme:
if you wanted to be able to have an independent view, and compete with the
work that was going on particularly in the USA at this stage, on that type of
modelling to address the global warming type issues, then I think the Met
Office was the place (ibid).
With its existing observational programmes and modelling capacities strength-
ened by both Mason and Houghton, and with its historical centrality as a provider of
public weather knowledge (Hall 2015b), the Met Office was widely considered to be
the natural place where ‘‘the nation’s resources should be drawn together to focus
effort on modelling the climate system’’.12 DoE actors, particularly Chief Scientist
David Fisk, had been convinced by the Met Office’s early advances, and
conversations began about the exact form a new climate centre would take.
Shaping the Centre
The Met Office’s core funding in the late 1980s came from the Ministry of Defence
(MoD), but the MoD’s interest in climate did not extend to long-term prediction.
Nonetheless pockets of research pertinent to the climate change question existed
throughout the Met Office, particularly in the Synoptic and Dynamic Climatology
branches, and in the model-building capacities of the numerical weather predictors.
Houghton’s ambition was to build on an existing culture of inter-branch
collaboration, to gather these fragments together into a new whole which would
in turn become a ‘‘focus’’ for other modelling efforts in the UK.13 Despite the
aforementioned internal objections to the Met Office becoming too involved with
climate change, which were soon overcome, Met Office actors saw themselves as
the only real option for a new national centre. Yet from a DoE perspective, the Met
Office offered advantages which were more than purely epistemic. As an
operational centre bound to government (albeit being increasingly pushed into
commercial independence), the Met Office was used to being told what to do, for
example,
being told by the [Royal Air Force] what…they need to know over the next six
hours to do one of their low altitude flights. So they were in some sense a little
better than one might have suspected a NERC unit to be, in which they would
have felt a little bit uneasy about being told what to do (interview, DoE
science advisor).
In contrast to ‘a NERC unit’, akin to UGAMP, the Met Office could offer fast
answers to political questions:
it looked like it was going to settle up to the fact that the UGAMP would go
round…at the pace and rigour that academic community like to trundle along
12 White, ‘UK National Climate Modelling Research Centre: A strategy document’, TNA AT 33/77.
13 Apling to Fisk, n.d., 1989, TNA AT 33/77.
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at. At least the Met Office would get something done. Because our feeling was
that the pace of all the stuff politically was beginning to wind up a bit… [the
Met Office] were naturally inclined to think they needed some guidance about
what were important questions, as opposed to what were interesting questions
(DoE science advisor, interview; emphasis added).
As correspondence went back and forth between the Met Office and DoE during
1989, the plans for the programme gradually took shape. The new centre would
initially draw together 15 existing staff members, funded under the existing MoD
contract, with 11 new employees funded by the new DoE contract. Emphasis was
also placed on the centre having an open door to visiting scientists, in order to aid its
functioning as a coordinating hub for UK climate change research. Yet despite this
desired collaborative ethos, according to a senior UGAMP scientist (interview),
there was no consultation with those of us in academia. And in fact there was a
feeling around that we were suddenly told this was the UK centre for climate
research and climate modelling. So the spider had been put in there, and all we
had in NERC was now seen as the web that fed to that spider.
Other established climate institutes also appeared a little perturbed when they
learned of the plans. Tom Wigley of the University of East Anglia’s Climatic
Research Unit (CRU) wrote to DoE in August of 1989: ‘‘I have heard rumours of
such a centre being set up…Actually, a UK climate change centre already exists – it
is called the Climatic Research Unit’’.14 But Wigley’s unit was considered by DoE
comparatively ‘‘small beer’’ when it came to modelling capacities next to the plans
being drawn up with the Met Office.15 A well-timed telephone call from John
Houghton assuaged the concerns of our above-quoted UGAMP scientist, although
the latter declined Houghton’s suggestion of melding the new Centre with UGAMP.
But for a time, it looked as though the Met Office centre might even outgrow the
bounds of a national climate centre.
In early 1989, figures in the Met Office and DoE seemed jointly keen on the
centre’s potential to be a focus for European climate modelling. One costed
proposal from the Met Office included estimates both for the new Met Office centre
and for a ‘European Centre for Climate Modelling’ to be located at Shinfield in
Berkshire, near to the European Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecasts
(ECMWF) which was opened in 1975. The annual cost of this European centre
would peak at £9 million in 1992/3, including the costs of a new building. For David
Fisk at DoE, this was clearly the intended direction, but perhaps on a larger scale
than DoE had anticipated: ‘‘it’s a start, but it’s also ridiculous’’, he noted on a copy
of the proposal. Nonetheless, Houghton believed that ‘‘[e]nhancement of our effort
during this period will also mean that the UK is in a strong position to play a leading
14 Wigley to Warrilow, 22 Aug 1989. TNA AT 33/77.
15 Annotated note, Warrilow to Apling, on Wigley to Warrilow, 22 Aug 1989. In the late 1980s, CRU
scientists developed a simple one-dimensional climate model called STUGE (which later evolved into
MAGICC) which subsequently proved influential in policy assessments, but it required parameter inputs
such as climate sensitivity estimates from GCMs and was calibrated against them.
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part in the setting up (hopefully in the UK) of appropriate European or other
international efforts’’.16
But rather than two parallel centres, the dominant thinking began to focus on the
new Met Office centre taking on a European role in the future, perhaps through a
direct application for European funds. For Houghton, it was important to pre-empt
any European designs and ‘‘to be seen to be active in order to try to prevent the EEC
[European Economic Community] taking unwelcome initiatives’’. Perhaps in
response to the DoE’s balking at initial costings, Houghton emphasised the greater
efficiency of collaboration between established or soon-to-be established European
‘‘centres of excellence’’. But he foresaw ‘‘pressure’’ growing for a dedicated
European centre, arguing that ‘‘we must be ready for it so that it can be landed in the
UK’’.17 Like Mason before him, Houghton was keen that the UK not be drowned-
out by outside voices in climate modelling; if independence was to be sacrificed to
Europe, the UK should at least be in the lead.18
But these European designs soon disappeared from correspondence and draft
plans. The German state was clearly committed to its own climate scientists in
Hamburg, investing funds into the DKRZ, while the emergence of the IPCC as a
venue for international cooperation and coordination perhaps undermined the need
for international centres: ‘‘elements of a cooperative world-wide venture already
exist in the contacts between Met Office scientists and their European and US
counterparts, fostered particularly by IPCC Working Group 1 activity’’.19 Yet DoE
was clearly still mindful of international competition: ‘‘Other groups currently have
the potential to enter this area, including teams from Australia, Canada, the Federal
Republic of Germany and France’’, read the DoE input to a 1989 Science &
Technology Select Committee enquiry into the Greenhouse Effect,20 although
mentions of Japan and the USSR were struck-out of early drafts.21 In an internal
DoE conversation about this ‘‘judicious reorientation of the science budget’’, the
European idea persisted. In a note following a DoE-Met Office meeting at which the
idea was seemingly put to bed, Fisk speculated: ‘‘It will take some swallowing of
pride for the brave BEF [presumably ‘British Expeditionary Force’] to go European,
but I view it as inevitable…Most authorities agree in private that the final goal in
10–15 years’ time can only be met at the European level’’.22 Senior DoE civil
servant David Burr replied: ‘‘If we actually believe that we can’t continue to go it
alone, should we be planning more consciously for alternatives?’’23 Encapsulating
16 Houghton to Fisk, 3 March 1989. TNA AT 33/77.
17 Houghton to Fisk, 6 March 1989. TNA AT 33/77.
18 Houghton’s wish to ‘land’ any European centre echoes the earlier arrival of ECMWF in the UK (see
note 8). Landing another European atmospheric science institution in the UK so soon would have been
quite a diplomatic achievement.
19 Burr to Fisk, 31 May 89. TNA AT 33/77.
20 See House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Session 1988–89, 6th Report,
Greenhouse Effect, October 1989.
21 TNA AT 33/77.
22 Fisk to Burr, 6 July 1989. TNA AT 33/77.
23 Burr to Fisk, 11 July 1989. TNA AT 33/77.
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what seemed to be a growing DoE anxiety that the Met Office, now focused entirely
on its own national plans, might cede ground to other internationally ambitious
institutions, David Warrilow, himself formerly of the Met Office, wondered in the
margins of a draft proposal, ‘‘have we missed the boat?’’
The Final Goals of Climate Science (and Policy)
What was this ‘final goal’ mentioned in Fisk’s speculations? By the end of the 1980s
climate modellers in both the US and the UK were seeking to go beyond equilibrium
experiments with doubled CO2 levels to the pursuit of ‘transient’ simulations, which
would model the response of the climate to changing atmospheric compositions, as
they unfolded over time, with the help of a dynamic ocean model coupled to the
atmosphere model. In addition to this greater temporal realism, DoE were keen on
spatial realism; that is, on climate simulations with a fine spatial resolution, capable
of resolving the climatic changes that might be expected on a national, rather than
just global, scale. Fisk’s estimate of a 10–15 year wait for transient simulations with
regional detail was optimistic in comparison with other estimates; DoE’s Select
Committee input from 1989, for example, estimated 15–20 years for ‘‘regional
‘forecasts’’’. An earlier ‘scenario’ of the development of UK climate research,
circulated as an internal memo within DoE in early 1988, claimed ‘‘it is possible to
speculate with some confidence how that picture [of future knowledge] will unfurl’’
(quoted in Shackley and Wynne 1996: 289). While quaintly over-ambitious in
hindsight, the scenario’s claim that climate models could be ‘‘completed’’ within 25
years is particularly striking. Shackley and Wynne (1995, 1996) argue that this
storyline of conquered uncertainty and resolved complexity performed an important
social function within this emerging science-policy interface. As ‘boundary-
ordering devices’ aiding in the complex management of uncertainty across science
and politics, such schedules see the more ‘‘disturbing and challenging dimensions of
uncertainty…translated into deterministically reducible ones’’. These mutually-
constructed visions of the future cement present relationships on the basis of what is
to come. ‘‘The territory of the future is staked out and reclaimed for present
commitments; hence the authority of the scientific program as currently formulated
is neatly reinforced’’ (Shackley and Wynne 1996: 287).
Transience and Temporal Realism
This informal ‘scenario’ of future climate research clearly informed the work
schedule which was mutually constructed between the Met Office and DoE for the
new climate centre. As drafts of the new contract evolved, transient and regional
simulations moved up the list of prioritised ‘deliverables’. While scientists and
research managers might view research schedules ‘‘with a mixture of irony and
ritual’’, they are important to policymakers, and often read ‘‘quite literally’’
(Shackley and Wynne 1996: 289). In this case, the pacing of the modelling
requirements was shaped quite explicitly by anticipated developments in interna-
tional policy. Hand-written notes by a DoE civil servant on the nature of the Met
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Office proposal stated that the requirement ‘‘is a definite product by 1992 before any
convention on climate’’, this definite product being a transient climate simulation.
When the Met Office came back with a revised schedule showing a completed
transient run in 1993, a DoE note in the margins queried – ‘‘1992?’’24
DoE made it clear to the Met Office that expectations were high for a model
which would be informing both Government and IPCC assessments:
I remember David Fisk saying right at the beginning about the model, ‘there
are no prizes for coming second’. He was very certain that if the Hadley
Centre model wasn’t the best, then we [DoE] shouldn’t use the Hadley Centre
model, we should use another model (Met Office scientist, interview).
But the push for transience was not just motivated by an epistemic telos which
defined progress and quality in climate modelling. Rather, for DoE, a transient
simulation had a particular political potential:
in other areas we’d had a golden rule that you only ever really got
environmental policy to move if either there were dead babies in the street or
what you wanted to do was easier anyway. Golden rule. And unless you’ve got
a transient model, you weren’t really picking up the dead babies… therefore
the transient model had a lot more political clout in it, in handling your
different people (DoE science advisor, interview).
Here, the potential of civil servants to persuade governments to act on an
environmental problem is linked to the visibility of damage, destruction or, in this
respondent’s gruesome metaphor, death. An equilibrium simulation, with its
hypothetical response to an experimental doubling of atmospheric CO2, could not
offer the kind of tractable realism demanded by this formulation of the link between
persuasion and policy. Rather than just inviting a conversation about the end of the
following century, with a transient experimental design a model could simulate, and
policymakers could see, the steady or perhaps even catastrophic warming of the
climate, and the accumulation of ‘impacts’, damages and losses along the way, the
simulation ‘‘tracking them all’’. Like earlier air pollution models (see above), a
temporally realistic transient simulation could sit more comfortably with a
regulatory culture founded on empiricism and high evidential standards.
By simulating climate change as a ‘‘cumulative’’ environmental problem – where
effects are the result of past, current and future activities – the new temporality of
transient simulations could also make a stronger link between schedules of future
scientific advice, policy development, and climatic damage. If arguments for a
strong policy response failed, ‘‘if we got rebutted the first time’’ (DoE science
advisor, interview), climate change would continue happening, the warming and its
side effects would continue to accumulate. If the first rebuttal concerned arguments
based on abstract equilibrium experiments, then the content of these arguments
would remain largely unchanged over time. Indeed, estimates of the equilibrium
climate sensitivity to a doubling of CO2 have remained remarkably consistent
between the late 1970s and today (IPCC 2014). To make the case again, one could
24 Draft Schedule, TNA AT 33/77.
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only return to the same numbers. By contrast, a transient simulation of accumulating
damage in ‘real time’ would have, for this DoE advisor, more persuasive ‘‘clout’’,
offering instead a more dynamic picture of a slowly unfolding future, seemingly
inexorable in its computational logic, yet controllable insofar as policymakers could
effect changes in the real world emissions profile: ‘‘If we’re into negotiations that
were looking at different futures, that’s the thing that’s got to be modelled’’ (DoE
official, interview). As in acid rain debates, the causal pathway became as important
as the endpoint since the former is more responsive to policies than the latter.
In publications of the first transient run by the Hadley Centre (Murphy 1992;
Murphy and Mitchell 1995), it is stressed that the simulated timescape of climate
change should not be considered equivalent to calendar years. For example, it is
explained how ‘‘the relative amplitude of the northern high latitude warming
increases in the second half of the experiment’’, rather than in the second half of the
21st century (Murphy and Mitchell 1995: 78, emphasis added). Yet despite this
careful policing of the boundary between experiment and the real world, it is clear
that the temporal realism of transient simulations was a political attraction. The wish
for a transient simulation before the 1992 international climate negotiations is a
significant example of how the practices, priorities and norms of climate science
were being ‘mutually constructed’ by scientific and political actors during this
formative period (Shackley and Wynne 1995; Krueck and Borchers 1999). Policy
demands were clearly setting the pace of scientific practice. Nonetheless, the
eventual 1992 Rio commitment to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 ‘‘was
not determined by, or even closely ‘calibrated’ to, specific scientific knowledge
yielded by current models’’ (ibid: 221) – not least because it was simply a ten-year
commitment; the sort of medium-term timescale which climate models still struggle
to handle (Meehl et al. 2014). The commitment was arguably more rooted in a
precautionary mode of environmental policymaking, whereby the burden of proof of
potential environmental harm is placed with opponents of regulatory action; if
regulation is to be avoided, its opponents must prove the safety of whatever activity
is seen as the source of harm. This stands in contrast to the preference for scientific
consensus on the evidence for the possibility of harm as a prerequisite for
regulation. As suggested above, a feature of UK regulatory culture and particularly
of Conservative praxis has been the emphasis on high standards of scientific
evidence. While the UK Government was busy putting together the Hadley Centre
programme to establish a strong evidence base, other European nations were placing
emphasis on the need for concrete policy targets:
the Dutch in particular were rather keen to do it the other way round really.
Which is ‘let’s have some targets’. And then of course, you know, it’s the
usual thing, ‘where is your energy policy if you’re a net fossil fuel exporter
like UK?’ You can’t really see a reason why, on its own, you’d want 1990
levels at 2000 (DoE science advisor, interview).
For this senior DoE advisor, this emerging precautionary preference for picking
‘‘targets out of the air’’ stood in contrast to the coincident setting up of the Hadley
Centre, which was ‘‘more deep, foundational in the way in which the Thatcher
administration was thinking about how you did things…Get more science, [get
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more] knowledge’’. Arguing the need for climate policy on the basis of a pioneering
transient experiment would, this advisor suggested, accord with Conservative
orientations to the future:
They don’t mind things that tell you how you’re going to economically grow,
give them the shape and the colour of it, right? And if they started to sense this
whole thing looked like, you know, Limits to Growth all over again, we’d be in
real shit (ibid).
Rather than emphasising targets, and hence ‘limits’ to economic expansion, a
transient run offered a legible and actionable future with the telos of economic
growth, and the possibilities of conventional economic management, retained (see
Russill 2016). The transient run was indeed completed in time for inclusion in an
IPCC supplementary report prepared in advance of the Rio talks, although the
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) at Princeton had just beaten the
Hadley Centre to the prize of performing the world’s first successful transient run
(Manabe et al. 1991; IPCC 1992; Folland et al. 2004). The Hadley Centre run was
completed despite the revelation in May 1989 that the Control Data Corporation was
pulling support for the ETA-10 supercomputer, on which the Met Office had been
relying as a replacement for its Cyber 205. This was ‘‘a bit of a disaster’’ for the
carefully constructed work programme of both the new climate centre and the Office
as a whole (interview, Met Office scientist). A Cray machine had to be sourced
instead, adding more than £4 million in hardware and installation costs. But with the
pressure on to come up with new results before 1992, the old Cyber supercomputer
had to be kept running long after the opening of the Hadley Centre to perform the
transient simulation, while the slow work of re-coding the GCM for the new Cray
computer proceeded in parallel.
Regional Visions
The prospect of regional climate simulation was another deliverable which rose up
the Hadley Centre agenda during the 1989 negotiations with DoE. For the former
DoE science advisor interviewed by us,
the regional modelling sort of crawled out of the IPCC process, because if
you were going to tell China it was going to be barren and no rainfall and all
the rest of it, there wasn’t any point talking about global average
temperatures, in one way or another you had to say something about the
South China Sea.
Regional climate modelling techniques had been emerging during the late 1980s
at NCAR, where scientists had been contracted to perform simulations of future
climates over potential nuclear waste storage sites (Dickinson et al. 1989). A
developing ‘dynamical downscaling’ approach saw a meso-scale weather prediction
model adjusted to the simulation of climate (mostly through the alteration of
radiation schemes), and ‘embedded’ within a global climate model (e.g. Giorgi and
Bates 1989). The global model would be run according to a given greenhouse gas
emissions scenario. At the boundaries of the domain to be covered by the regional
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model, the global model would provide ‘boundary conditions’ (i.e. fluxes of matter
and energy) for the regional simulation. As early work appeared to show, regional
modelling offered the twin benefits of increased climatic realism as local
topography could be accounted for, while increased physical resolutions accorded
persuasively with ‘‘common sense notions of realism such as 3-D spatial meaning’’
(Shackley and Wynne 1995: 225-6).
To many at the time, the move towards regional climate simulation was
seemingly ‘‘an entirely natural development’’ (Sir John Houghton, interview), a
‘‘reasonable’’ direction in which to extend modelling capacities (DoE official,
interview). Regional models offered scientists the means of exploring regional
responses to climate change, and even of re-connecting weather and climate through
the dynamical simulation of local weather patterns – a task clearly at home at the
Met Office, where weather and climate modellers shared computing facilities and
often moved between weather and climate divisions (Sir John Houghton, interview).
A regional model ‘‘was seen as essential’’ for refining the picture of future climate
over the UK, which was represented very coarsely in global models (DoE official,
interview). In 1990 the Climate Change Impacts Review Group was set-up under
Martin Parry, with a mandate to assess the impact of future climate change on the
UK. Although this body and its successor, the UK Climate Impacts Programme, did
not make direct use of regional model output until the 2000s (Hulme and Dessai
2008), the pursuit of a more resolutely regional picture of the future of climate was
underway by 1990. Regional climate prediction was a ‘‘policymaker’s delight’’
(UGAMP senior scientist, interview), a claim borne out by a DoE official
(interview):
I’ll tell you why it was important to me and other people in the research
programme. It was because of our experience with critical loads actually. And
what matters to people is what’s going on here [gestures a small area].
Interviewer: how many salmon does it save?
Respondent: Yeah. And unless you can provide that sort of information,
there’s no way that people can be confident about the impacts in their area.
Earlier civil service experience of the challenges of using models to persuade
policymakers (e.g. with respect to acid rain) informed an enthusiasm for the spatial
realism offered by regional climate modelling. Thatcher herself emphasised the
work needed ‘‘to estimate the detailed distribution of the effects of global climate
change…We want to know what’s happening in the regions’’ (Thatcher 1990).
However, there was noticeable unease about the scheduling of such work in the
Hadley Centre programme. At a meeting of the Meteorological Research Sub-
Committee in April 1991, Sir John Mason ‘‘asked why the regional model featured
so early in the plan’’. The Hadley Centre’s David Bennetts emphasised the
epistemic potential of the tool in helping to gain understanding of the behaviour of
the global model, and to enable comparison with other techniques of generating
regional information. However, perhaps detecting other pressures to develop and
operationalise regional modelling, Brian Hoskins, Director of UGAMP at Reading,
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‘‘urged caution on regional models’’,25 based on concerns that unless global models
could resolve meso-scale meteorological processes, downscaled predictions of
regional change had questionable value. But despite these challenges, there was
clear scientific and political momentum behind the Centre’s push for regional
simulations.
The Hadley Centre on a Public Stage
What’s in a name? Seemingly a lot about the politics of carving out a new
institutional space in the borderlands of science and politics. As the Met Office and
DoE together sought a suitable name for the new centre, a key criterion was a
separate identity for the DoE-funded prediction work, as opposed to the ‘‘baseline
MoD work on the subject’’. The name should be non-parochial in character, yet
flexible enough to allow ‘‘for possible future expansion if in the future the centre
becomes an explicit focus of European research in this area’’26 – the British
Expeditionary Force may yet be crossing the Channel. Two DoE civil servants
professed to having ‘‘invested an inordinate amount of time with very expensive
Met Office senior officers over the name for the centre’’.27 John Houghton
‘‘grudgingly’’ dropped his desire for the Meteorological Office to feature at the start
of the official name, while George Hadley was eventually chosen over Harold
Jeffreys as a target of tribute (interview, DoE official). The ‘Hadley Centre for
Climate Research and Prediction’ was quickly abandoned for its unfortunate
acronym. But Hadley himself was a hit – less obscure than previous suggestions,
scientifically relevant for his 1730s work on the trade winds (perhaps an early
‘general circulation model’), and ‘‘ideal from the point of view of the Centre
opening speech’’ – Hadley was a ‘‘barrister turned scientist’’, and thus a mirror
image of Thatcher, who was set to cut the ribbon. A Fellow of the Royal Society,
Hadley was ‘‘British but with no obvious political disadvantages’’28; indeed, as one
DoE researcher sent to the archives reported, ‘‘There is much in the Hadley family
that commends them, and especially George to honour: self-taught, skilled,
industrious, a family that worked together’’29; a model citizen of a Thatcherite
Britain, perhaps.
DoE figures were clearly still concerned about other research groups taking
umbrage at this centralisation of climate change work, and agonised that the name
suggest ‘‘one centre among many’’. As Alan Apling pointed out at the time, the
branding of UGAMP ‘‘does not imply no one else does modelling’’. But the key
point for DoE was perhaps to obtain sufficient distinction from the rest of the Met
Office, ‘‘so that DoE is unfettered in using the prediction programme politically and
25 Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of the Meteorological Research Sub-Committee, 15 April 1991.
Document kindly supplied by David Carson.
26 Draft submission from Dr Fisk to PS-SOS on the climate prediction initiative, TNA AT 33/78.
27 Apling to Fisk, 26 Jan 1990. TNA AT 33/78.
28 Draft submission from Dr Fisk to PS-SOS on the climate prediction initiative, TNA AT 33/78.
29 Goodier to Apling, 22 March 1990. TNA AT 33/78.
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diplomatically’’.30 The ‘Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research’ thus
emerged as a distinct and yet malleable political object, building on the predictive
authority of the Met Office, yet something which could be used to bolster political
arguments being made both within and by the Government.
With the work programme finalised (albeit subject to ongoing review) and a
three-year rolling contract beginning at £5.7 million per year agreed,31 the Hadley
Centre was officially opened on 25th May 1990. Thatcher, fresh from a briefing by
John Houghton on the findings of the IPCC report which were being finalised that
same week, penned a speech with Houghton’s assistance to deliver at the opening.32
The speech praised the work of the IPCC, argued that the climatic past was
becoming a less reliable guide to the future, and emphasised the need for investment
in modelling to ‘‘help us look into the future and predict more precisely the changes
in our climate’’. The address also included an announcement that ‘‘Britain is
prepared to set itself the very demanding target of a reduction of up to 30 per cent in
presently-projected levels of carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005’’ – not so
much a cut as a stabilisation at 1990 levels, falling short of the European target of
returning to 1990 levels earlier, by 2000 (which would ultimately form the basis of
the 1992 Rio commitment). Thatcher’s target was conditional on ‘‘others’’ being
‘‘ready to take their full share’’ (Thatcher 1990), thus wedding British policy to the
UN process while furthering an awkward transatlantic brokerage between the
northern Europeans and the US.33 In the US policy discourse had appeared
increasingly obfuscatory, emphasising scientific uncertainties and eschewing talk of
targets, to an even greater extent than in the UK. Thatcher’s announcement was
greeted with disappointment by activists and the left-leaning press, who saw it as
representing a ‘‘position that falls well short of virtually every call for action on
global warming so far’’34, including the suggested strategies of the IPCC report. For
many commentators, Thatcher’s emphasis on ‘getting the science right’ looked
increasingly like delaying tactics (Rose 1990).
Discussion and Conclusions
What is remarkable about the scientific and political discussions of this period is
how closely aligned they are. While the details of policy commitments may not have
matched up to some of the demands being made by scientists and political
advocates, a shared discourse of scientific complexity, of the powers of general
circulation models and the promises of regional prediction can be detected in
30 Apling to Fisk, 26 Jan 1990. TNA AT 33/78.
31 Between £12m and £16m at present values.
32 This high-profile event recalls the Met Office’s first ever press conference, convened in November
1965 by John Mason to announce the start of operational NWP (Hall 2015b). Interesting questions are
raised here concerning the links between computer modelling and the public performance of scientific
authority.
33 Nicholson-Lord, D., ‘Lord make us green, but not yet’, The Independent, 27 May 1990.
34 Ibid.
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documents ranging from Met Office proposals through DoE memos to Prime
Ministerial speeches.35 We can see in the emergence of the Hadley Centre the birth
of the shared ‘policy culture’ described by Shackley and Wynne (1996), which
placed complex climate models at the centre of new deliberations about energy
policy and natural resource use, and eventually local planning (Hulme and Dessai
2008). Yet we want to suggest that this ‘policy culture’ was not an entirely new
phenomenon – it had roots in a wider regulatory culture and was shaped by
processes at various scales.
The emergence of the Hadley Centre reconfigured horizontal relationships
between national climatological expertise and political authority. Climate scientists
were brought into a new, close relationship with policymakers. This close
relationship was not inevitable, as evidenced by its uniqueness (Shackley 2001;
Krueck and Borchers 1999). Rather, it can be considered a historically contingent
product of a regulatory culture which prizes ‘independent’, pragmatic judgement on
issues which appear to transcend accepted visions of natural and social order. This
desire for independent judgement was shared across science and politics: in the Met
Office, senior scientists showed some scepticism towards the ‘alarmist’ claims of
American modellers; in Government, civil servants managed to reconcile a potential
‘‘empiricist distrust’’ of models with emerging, more spatially and temporally
‘realistic’ forms of climate simulation (cf. Jasanoff 2011: 137). The capacity to
predict was seen as allied to the capacity to adopt a political stance independent of
both Europe and the US; empiricist caution was manifest here not in distrust of all
models, but in a wish to develop a trusty model of one’s own. But this relationship
between science and politics should not be conceived of linearly. Policy was not
driven straightforwardly by science; the search for more certain science was in itself
a policy choice.
It has often been claimed that Thatcher’s scientific background was crucial in her
positive response to the claims of Houghton and others. We join Agar (2015) in
refuting this argument. The Thatcher-the-scientist hypothesis cannot neatly explain
her initial scepticism of the early 1980s, nor her apparent reluctance to commit to
stringent policy measures in 1990 or her subsequent recourse to more sceptical
arguments about the reality of climate change and the economic costs of action (see
Thatcher 2002). As critical commentators at the time noted, Thatcher’s apparently
Damascene conversion to the cause of climate change came with rhetoric
reminiscent of the UK’s laggardly approach to acid rain and ozone depletion,
where calls for more science could be interpreted as part of political delaying tactics
(e.g. Rose 1990). While schedules of scientific research clearly helped scientists
gain long-term government funding commitments (Shackley and Wynne 1996),
they perhaps also contributed to the deflection of political action into the future. The
promise of regional prediction, for example, accorded with Thatcher’s apparent
wish ‘‘to know what is happening in the regions…we should have a better
understanding of many of these things in ten or fifteen years’ time’’ (Thatcher
1990); such statements were interpreted by some critics at the time as ‘meaningful
35 In the latter case, of course, we have the example of one speech co-written by a Prime Minister and the
chief of a national meteorological service.
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policy can therefore wait’.36 While an air of urgency emanated from both Met
Office scientists and DoE officials, we might also argue that their emphasis on sound
science – a key part of the rhetorical and practical toolkit of contemporary
environmental policy – furnished ministers and other departments with a reason to
‘wait and see’, the public commitment to climate science offering ‘‘the appearance
of activity while postponing substantive action’’.37
The notion of civic epistemology can help us make sense of these apparent
contradictions. As a ‘‘tried-and-true’’ repertoire of problem-solving (Jasanoff 2004:
40), a British civic epistemology of pragmatic empiricism, ‘sound science’ and
independent judgement pervaded this institutionalisation of climate prediction, with
diverse actors able to draw on this well-worn repertoire to build alliances and justify
actions. There was thus something very British about the way the Hadley Centre
was positioned as a new scientific institution. But this horizontal reorganisation of
science and politics also occurred amid important vertical reorganisations. This was
a period of a new ‘epistemic constitutionalism’ regarding climate change, whereby
nation states ‘‘delegated the role of articulating and defending a shared epistemic
foundation for global policy debates to a centralized, international institution’’, that
is, the IPCC (Miller 2009: 142). It is striking that the story of the Hadley Centre,
from the first proposals to its opening, is bounded by the cycle of the IPCC First
Assessment Report (FAR). The process of defining the Centre’s work programme
proceeded alongside and, to some extent, in dialogue with the preparation of the
FAR, which was part-supported by the British Government itself through the Met
Office support unit which itself was located within the Hadley Centre by the time of
the latter’s public opening, providing a ‘‘hotline’’ between the two institutions
(Krueck and Borchers 1999: 116). Indeed, IPCC requirements continued to shape
Hadley Centre research priorities over subsequent assessment cycles (ibid). This is a
key example of the influence of the IPCC on the organisation and conduct of science
on the national level – a feature not currently acknowledged by studies of the IPCC
process, which is largely conceived as something passively responsive to pre-
existing science, and only active in its delivery of a scientific message to
policymakers (Hulme and Mahony 2010). We can see here how the IPCC was
shaping scientific practice from the very start, in the shaping of institutions and the
planning of work.
However, the shaping of the Hadley Centre illustrates how nation states were
keen on exercising and strengthening their own epistemic sovereignty, a process still
observable today (e.g. Mahony 2014). We therefore need to consider epistemic
constitutionalism as a process occurring on multiple, interacting scales. Between
1988 and 1990 Thatcher took to both the national and international stage to profess
a concern for climate change; a period when, the Cold War all but over, the global
environment offered a new space for political internationalism. Reflecting on her
choice to talk about the environment at the UN General Assembly in 1989, at which
36 See, for example, Nicholson-Lord, D., ‘Lord make us green, but not yet’, The Independent, 27 May
1990.
37 This quote is from a Department of Energy civil servant and is contained in the leaked minutes of a
meeting on climate policy between the Confederation of British Industry and the Department of Energy.
See Rose (1990: 294).
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she announced the Hadley Centre plans, a former DoE advisor appealed not to her
scientific background, but to her desire for political grandstanding at the ‘end of
history’: ‘‘what else [were] you going to talk about?’’ (DoE science advisor,
interview).
The emergence of the Hadley Centre thus symbolizes, and was part of, a key
epistemic shift in understandings of climate and climatic change. More historical
work is required to trace the impact of new practices of prediction – such as
transient and regional – on these understandings. In a 1987 meeting between UK
climate scientists organised by DoE and NERC, it was considered
crucial that the UK supports truly global and multi-disciplinary approaches to
studying the climate system. Clearly, the potential local impacts of any
suggested climate change are of paramount importance to the UK but we must
guard against any suggestion that climate-change issues can in general be
studied from a parochial regional viewpoint. Regional studies should be
conducted with proper regard being paid to results stemming from a global
approach.38
This ‘global approach’ was new, and was part of the co-production of newly
global forms of knowledge and political order. It was an approach formed by the
new hegemony of global climate models over alternative approaches to climate
change which emphasised local environment-society interactions and determinants
of risk (Russill 2016). This globalism was helped along by the vertical
reorganisation of science and politics which saw institutions like the IPCC come
to prominence amid political discourses of global action and cooperation (Miller
2004). We can read this warning against regional parochialism as concerning both
the structures of scientific cooperation, and the emerging interest in regional climate
prediction as enabled by global models. In this 1987 formulation, climate could no
longer be considered a place-bound phenomenon (Heymann 2010). Instead, the
global took precedence, both as an epistemic object and a political condition.
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